The law of maturity is the belief that less-observed events are becoming mature and, therefore, more likely to occur in the future. Previous studies have shown that the assumption of infinite exchangeability contradicts the law of maturity. In particular, it has been shown that infinite exchangeability contradicts probabilistic descriptions of the law of maturity such as the gambler’s belief and the belief in maturity. We show that the weaker assumption of finite exchangeability is compatible with both the gambler’s belief and (...) belief in maturity. We provide sufficient conditions under which these beliefs hold under finite exchangeability. These conditions are illustrated with commonly used parametric models. (shrink)

It is well known that Frege's system in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. Frege's instantiation rule for the second-order universal quantifier makes his system, except for minor differences, full (i.e., with unrestricted comprehension) second-order logic, augmented by an abstraction operator that abides to Frege's basic law V. A few years ago, Richard Heck proved the consistency of the fragment of Frege's theory obtained by restricting the comprehension schema to predicative formulae. He further conjectured that the more encompassing Δ11-comprehension (...) schema would already be inconsistent. In the present paper, we show that this is not the case. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Tetsugaku Companion to Nishida Kitarō ed. by Matsumaru Hisao, Arisaka Yoko, and Lucy Christine SchultzFernando Wirtz (bio)Tetsugaku Companion to Nishida Kitarō. Edited by Matsumaru Hisao, Arisaka Yoko, and Lucy Christine Schultz. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2022. Pp. v + 240. Hardcover $109.99, isbn 978–3-319417-83-7.This collection of essays has several virtues. First, although Nishida is one of the most widely translated Japanese philosophers into English, this is the first collection (...) of interpretative essays that attempts to cover the different aspects and stages of his work in a comprehensive manner.Second, this collection gives voice to several Japanese scholars who have long been working on Nishida's philosophy, but who are nevertheless little known outside Japan. Of course, as the editors explain in the introduction, the book intentionally seeks to incorporate perspectives that may dislocate the reader given the "fact that academic authors in countries other than the English-speaking Anglo-American regions write differently to express their ideas" (p. vii). This is a significant gesture, since Japanese philosophy has from its very beginnings been wracked by the problem of translation and counter-translation. It is an act of courage for the book to acknowledge that there are different "forms of expression" that, even if they may confuse the Anglo-American reader, serve to broaden the reader's philosophical sensibility (p. xiii–xiv).Third, rather than each chapter limiting itself to expounding Nishida's thought in a general way, each in turn problematizes specific aspects of the philosopher's work, connecting it with other authors and problems.As the editors explain, the book has a bipartite structure. In the first part, several contributors explore "seven principal concepts" that are intended to reflect Nishida's perception of his own system, while in the second part, contributors investigate the place of Nishida's thought in the global history of philosophy, drawing connections between Nishida's thought and other fields such as religion, science, and art. In addition, the relevance of his thought to both the present and the future is discussed. The book includes an appendix with a chronology of Nishida's life and work and also a glossary of fundamental concepts.In Chapter 1, Nakajima Yuta explores the concept of "pure experience," highlighting its importance in Nishida's later philosophy and its relation to the self-developing structure of consciousness. In particular, Nakajima analyzes the influence of Wilhelm Wundt's Outlines of Psychology in the work An Inquiry into [End Page 1] the Good. In that sense, this article provides the historical context in which Nishida developed his ideas in contrast to the psychologist. As the author points out: "The main point of criticism is that Nishida regards the foundational elements in Wundtian psychology as mere virtual abstractions of the primordial systematic unity of experience" (p. 7). This last statement leads to the recognition that any linguistic limitation of this primordial unity becomes an abstraction, since pure experience is the framework of the meaningful, where all meanings are dynamically generated and superimposed (p. 10).Itabashi Yūjin, in Chapter 2, establishes the transition from pure experience to "absolute free will" in the work, Intuition and Reflection in Self-Awareness, by comparing Nishida's text with the philosophies of Cohen and Schopenhauer. To understand this transition, we must not lose sight, as the author says, that when the self reflects itself in itself, it is self-producing and self-determining. This self-determination is not purely intellectual, but a total activity in which "thinking and sensation are one" (p. 20). Thus, the will is absolute because there is nothing prior to the self-productive activity of the will. For this reason, it is precisely in religious experience that "authentic life" (p. 22) emerges from the negation of the subjective self, that is, from the fiction of a foundation of absolute will.The person responsible for presenting the concept of "self-awareness" is Okada Katsuaki. In Chapter 3, Okada takes as a starting point the "subjectless" (p. 28) character of the Japanese language in order to explain the paradoxical possibility of experience experiencing itself. (p. 30). The self-awareness of the activity of the previous chapters becomes... (shrink)

ABSTRACT Critiques leveled at epistemic decolonization call for a reorientation in theories of colonialism. The colonial imagination, a rhetorical tool that normalizes a sensible order of dispossession and appropriation, can be a reoriented site of contestation. By imagining an identity whose only means of relating is through opposition, the colonial imagination renders identities that inhabit a state of solitude. Two letters from Hernán Cortés to King Carlos V of Spain show how this colonial imagining aims to normalize dispossession and appropriation (...) of the relations Originary peoples have with lands, waters, airs, and other-than-human relatives. Considering this argument, rhetorical studies needs to readjust its analytical timeframe beyond the times of settler-colonial nation-states and colonization. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo analizar la utilización de grupos bárbaros reducidos, por parte de las autoridades imperiales, desde fines del siglo IV hasta comienzos del siglo V. En primer lugar, abordaremos cuestiones tales como el modo en que estos tipos de contingentes eran empleados en el ejército romano tardío. En segundo término, la cuestión de su integración en las estructuras imperiales en relación a los citados modos de empleo. Finalmente, analizaremos las representaciones de dichos contingentes por parte de (...) los autores de la época. (shrink)

A crise dos modelos de representação fundadas em unidades coerentes e ordenadas parece ter como um dos traços o que Bruno Latour (1993) chamou de “híbridos”(1). Os híbridos são a figura da multiplicidade que não cabe em categorias e que a modernidade “varia para baixo do tapete”. Atualmente, assistimos ao “retorno dos que nunca foram”, que interpelam de forma contundente nossas formas de vida, fortemente apoiadas na técnica. Mas como apreender os fluxos de discursos e práticas mediatizadas que nos atravessam (...) sem cair nas armadilhas do tecnicismo? Que configurações poderiam hoje assumir práticas e discursos críticos? Que agenciamentos propor? Tentar compreender o estatuto do tecnológico, do político, do artístico, do urbano e do banal como “artes do fazer” parece-nos uma tarefa urgente e necessária. Gilles Deleuze (1977), em “Kafka, por uma literatura menor” (2), deixa-nos uma importante pista, ao afirmar, em sua definição de agenciamento, que “a técnica é antes de tudo social”. A direção nos permite avançar para além das concepções instrumentalistas e dicotômicas da técnica e percebê-la enquanto processo complexo de mediação. De fato, como também afirmava Simondon (1989), os objetos técnicos sempre foram gerados por mediação e geradores de mediação(4). O presente número da Revista Logos traz justamente contribuições para fomentar esse debate e para compor o já vasto quadro das cartografias sobre tecnologia e sociabilidade no Brasil, no campo das possibilidades de mediação sociotécnica. Trata-se de um número especial, organizado dentro da parceria PPGC-Uerj e Centre d’Etudes sur l”Actuel et lê Quotidien (CEAQ) - Paris V, com a colaboração do Professor Stéphane Hugon, coordenador do GRETECH, grupo de pesquisa sobre Tecnologia e Quotidiano. Se, por um lado, o conjunto de artigos compartilha determinados referenciais teóricos, por outro, acolhe também visões próprias, forjadas a partir de diferentes experiências sociais e em distintos contextos culturais. Em comum, todos partem de certa forma da percepção de que as mediações presentes nos processos de sociabilidade podem colaborar nos processos de negociação com as regras e códigos sociais vigentes para inventar outros possíveis. Todos, de certa forma, dão a ver, em seu conjunto, que entramos numa arena onde os diversos elementos que constituem o social interagem e ganham novos contornos: o político não dialoga apenas com o “ideológico”, mas também com o cultural, o subjetivo, o artístico. Da mesma forma, a arte, por exemplo, não diz respeito apenas ao cânone, mas também ao político, ao urbano, ao sensual e ao banal. Com isso, também a noção de tecnologia se amplia e, entendida como “máquina social”, pode ajudar-nos a melhor apreender as dimensões dos fenômenos culturais e de comunicação hoje. Os onze textos reunidos neste número apontam exatamente para o momento singular em que vivemos sob alguns de seus mais diversos ângulos. Stéphane Hugon da Universidade René Decartes-Paris V/CEAQ discute a importância dos processos de apropriação da tecnologia no quotidiano; João Maia e Eduardo Bianchi, da UERJ, abordam a sociabilidade de jovens adolescentes de uma favela carioca como forma criativa de cidadania; Vicenzo Susca, da Universidade René Decartes-Paris V e da Università di Lingue e Comunicazione de Milão, aborda o aspecto subversivo das tecnologias, através de uma perspectiva transpolítica; Beatriz Bretas da UFMG apresenta estudos de caso sobre modos de organização de redes sociais virtuais no Brasil; Fabio Larocca discute como as tecnologias alteram nosso olhar sobre as dinâmicas sócio-espaciais no contexto das cidades; Florian Dauphin faz uma análise do sofware livre na França, país com uma das mais fortes tradições de organização social desse movimento na Europa; José Pinheiro Neves, da Universidade do Minho, recupera a contribuição de Simondon para uma análise da percepção das imagens nas telas dos computadores; Shangsub Choi, do Korea Information Society Development Institute, aborda as mudanças propiciadas pela internet no quotidiano de pessoas e empresas e as possibilidades de contra-poder; a arquiteta e urbanista Julieta Leite aposta na integração das tecnologias digitais aos tecidos da cidade para a construção de novas experiências espaciais coletivas; Maria da Luz Correia analisa a recuperação da comunicação por cartões postais nos dias atuais. Finalmente, Hedi Zamouri faz uma etnografia da Brigada Anti-Pub, movimento contra o abuso da publicidade nos espaços públicos de Paris e José Cláudio Castanheira resenha o último livro de Shetyl Turkle, “História íntima dos objetos”. A Logos 29, edição especial, chega assim aos leitores com uma gama variada de proposições e de lugares de observação, brindando-nos com novas pistas para a análise de questões que compõem a pesquisa atual no campo da comunicação. Desejamos a todos uma boa leitura. Fernando Gonçalves Editor temático desta edição especial da Logos. Professor adjunto da Faculdade de Comunicação Social da Uerj e membro do Grupo de pesquisa Comunicação, Arte e Cidade, do PPGC-Uerj, onde leciona a disciplina “Tecnologias e Formas de Vinculação Social”. Notas 1 Latour, Bruno. Jamais fomos modernos. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. 34, 1994. 2 Deleuze, Gilles. Kafka, por uma literatura menor. Rio de Janeiro: Imago, 1977. 3 Simondon, Gilbert. Du mode d’existence des objets techniques. 4eme Édition. Paris: Aubier, 1989. (shrink)

It is well known that Frege's system in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. Frege's instantiation rule for the second-order universal quantifier makes his system, except for minor differences, full (i.e., with unrestricted comprehension) second-order logic, augmented by an abstraction operator that abides to Frege's basic law V. A few years ago, Richard Heck proved the consistency of the fragment of Frege's theory obtained by restricting the comprehension schema to predicative formulae. He further conjectured that the more encompassing Δ₁¹-comprehension (...) schema would already be inconsistent. In the present paper, we show that this is not the case. (shrink)

En el marco del V Congreso Internacional «La actualidad de Michel Foucault» celebrado en la Universidad Complutense de Madrid entre el 6 y el 8 de marzo de 2018, sostuvimos una interesante conversación con Daniel Lorenzini, investigador del pensamiento ético y político de Michel Foucault y editor de varios de sus cursos y conferencias publicadas en los últimos años en Francia. Discutimos sobre el estado actual de los archivos de Foucault adquiridos por la Biblioteca Nacional de Francia (BnF), algunos de (...) los diversos proyectos editoriales que se derivan del trabajo de archivo y análisis de los manuscritos del filósofo, la reciente e inesperada publicación de Les aveux de la chair y su relación con el proyecto de la Historia de la sexualidad tal como fue planteado en 1976, la relación de Foucault con Nietzsche respecto a sus lecturas de la subjetivación y el vínculo, no siempre evidente, entre ética y política a la luz de sus investigaciones sobre el filósofo francés. (shrink)

Tomando como ponto de partida o diálogo "Clara", escrito por Schelling, o autor faz da conexão da Natureza com o Espírito o fio condutor da trajetória do pensamento schellinguiano. É, antes de tudo, na disputa com as filosofias de Fichte e Hegel, que se revela a convergência entre a concepção transcendental do Espírito e a filosofia da Natureza, dando-se assim a entender a importância de um conceito especulativo da Natureza como acesso ao mundo real. Taking the dialogue "Clara", written by (...) Schelling, as a starting point, the author uses the conection of Nature with the Spirit as a guiding line for his exposition of Schelling’s thought. It is, above all, the dispute with the philosophies of Fichte e Hegel that reveals the convergence between a transcendental conception of Spirit and the philosophy of Nature. Thus, the author implies the importance of speculative concept of Nature as an access to the real world. (shrink)

Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. This system is, except for minor differences, second-order logic together with an abstraction operator governed by Frege’s Axiom V. A few years ago, Richard Heck showed that the ramified predicative second-order fragment of the Grundgesetze is consistent. In this paper, we show that the above fragment augmented with the axiom of reducibility for concepts true of only finitely many individuals is still consistent, and that elementary Peano arithmetic (and more) is interpretable in this (...) extended system. (shrink)

v. 1. Natural law theories -- v. 2. Legal positivism.

V.E. Frankl’s ideas on suffering, death and human time are examined in this article. All three are interrelated, as they make no sense if not from the standpoint of the close bond of individual human intimacy with a personal God.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cervantes in Italy:Christian Humanism and the Visual Impact of Renaissance RomeFernando CervantesToward the end of 1569, shortly after his twenty-second birthday, Miguel de Cervantes arrived in Rome to serve as chamberlain to the young monsignor Giulio de Acquaviva, soon to be made a cardinal by Pope Pius V.1 The event marked the beginning of a six-year sojourn about which surprisingly little is known with certainty. From scattered semiautobiographical references (...) we can infer that Cervantes traveled widely and that he developed a particular fondness for Italy. We know for sure that he fought bravely against the Turks at the battle of Lepanto in 1571, where he received wounds that rendered his left arm useless for the rest of his life, and that he remained in service as a soldier, based in Italy, until his ill-fated attempt to return to Spain in 1575. Ten years later, in the dedication of his pastoral romance La Galatea to Ascanio Colonna, he reminded his dedicatee that the reverence he had for him did not only stem from having served under his illustrious father, the famous general Marco Antonio Colonna, but also from the many things that he had heard Cardinal Acquaviva say, "like prophesies," about him in Rome. There follows a brief encomium about the "noble virtues," "magnificence," "goodness," and "Christianity" that sustain the "clear and generous line" of the Colonnas, known to all for the "virtuous and heroic deeds" that have been their mark since time immemorial.2 Some of Cervantes's best lyric poetry dates from these years. In it, as in the rest of his work, the unmistakable mark of Petrarch, Boccaccio, Sannazaro, Ariosto, and Bembo, to name but the most explicit ones, leaves us in little doubt about his genuine love of Italian literature.For good reasons, modern biographers have been loath to take these scattered [End Page 325] references too candidly. Can we, for example, assume that Cervantes had more than a very superficial acquaintance with the Colonnas and the Acquavivas? Could a writer still widely regarded as a self-taught, untutored mind realistically have attracted the favors of some of the most illustrious Roman and Neapolitan noble families? More pointedly, is it safe to take the varied and abundant observations about Italy scattered throughout his works as reliable reflections of his own personal experiences? After all, between the latter and the written page there is a time lag often approaching forty years. Add to this the weight of subsequent intellectual influences and of literary conventions, of novelistic invention and of the viewpoints of the characters themselves, and we are left on rather shaky ground. As Jean Canavaggio has remarked, it is not Cervantes the keen visual observer, but rather Cervantes the devoted reader of Boccaccio and the novellieri who brings Italy and Italian themes into his fiction. Even the memorable descriptions of Italian cities to be found in some of his novelas are rather formulaic passages, perfectly in tune with the rhetorical canons of the time.3Our topic, however, is not biography but intellectual history; and here we can afford to be more candid. There can be no doubt that many of Cervantes's descriptions have the unmistakable ring of genuine experience. Take Tomás Rodaja's arrival, "soaked, sleep-deprived and with bags under the eyes," in Genoa's "sheltered Mandraccio,"4 where he becomes acquainted withthe smoothness of the Trebbiano, the fullness of the Montefiascone, the strength of the Asperino, the generosity of the Greeks Candia and Soma, the grandeur of the one from the Five Vineyards, the sweetness and mellowness of the lady Vernaccia, the rustic touch of the Centola, while the lowly one from Rome dared not appear in the presence of such illustrious gentlemen.5Charmed by the gallantry of the Genoese, Rodaja leaves by land for Rome, "the queen of cities and mistress of the world." "Just as the size and ferocity of a lion can be gauged by its claws," Cervantes observed,so Rome's greatness became manifest by its broken marbles, its statues..., its fallen arches and ruined baths, its magnificent porticoes and large amphitheatres, its famous and sacred river whose waters... (shrink)

continent. 1.1 (2011): 27-32. “My”—what does this word designate? Not what belongs to me, but what I belong to,what contains my whole being, which is mine insofar as I belong to it. Søren Kierkegaard. The Seducer’s Diary . I can’t sleep till I devour you / And I’ll love you, if you let me… Marilyn Manson “Devour” The role of poetry in the relationalities between people has a long history—from epic poetry recounting tales of yore; to emotive lyric poetry; to (...) rude, irreverent limericks; to Hallmark cards which have ditties that allow one to cringe, and somehow fall in love at the same moment. Without going into a notion of aesthetics, or attempting to choose which form of poetry is superior, we might want to consider why the form of poetry itself has long been a part of relationality. And whilst doing so, we might always keep in mind that poetry—especially poetry that moves, transports us—is the form that Plato has been warning us about, particularly if we want to become good citizens.As Avital Ronell teaches us in Stupidity : the poet, irremediably split between exaltation and vulgarity, between the autonomy that produces the concept within intuition and the foolish earthly being, functions as a contaminant for philosophy—a being who at least since Plato, has been trying to read and master an eviction notice served by philosophy. The poet as genius continues to threaten and fascinate, menacing the philosopher with the beyond of knowledge. Philosophy cringes (287). And considering that the philosopher is the lover of wisdom, we might begin to ask ourselves why one lover is warning against another—if the philosopher is in love with wisdom, then is the poet perhaps his rival, his challenger, for that very love? For, one must also remember that Plato—through Socrates—mentions constantly that Homer is his favourite. Moreover, by adopting both his own voice, whilst mixing it with Socrates’, Plato is adopting the form of poetry that he warns most about—the warning almost serves more as a homage to poetry than anything else. Here, we might open the register that one of the main reasons that he ejects a particular kind of poet is on the grounds of effecting effeminacy on the populace—good poetry moves you, affects you, transports you, shifts you beyond reason, puts you “out of your mind.” However, Plato also teaches us that rhetoric in its highest form requires divine inspiration by way of the daemon, or the muse. This moment of divine intervention is one that seizes—perhaps even ceases—you; putting you “beyond yourself.” In other words, a good rhetorician must always already be open to the possibility of otherness—the same otherness that possibly resides in the feminine. One could also trace this back to the poet that he both loved, and feared, most—Homer. Perhaps the effect of effeminacy that Homer's poetry opened is precisely the source of its power: through listening to Homer, one's body, one’s habitus is opened to the possibility of the feminine. And here, one must remember that the source of all learning—and all teaching—also lies in mimesis, in repetition, in habit. Once the habitus is opened to the possibility of invasion, of intervention, of otherness, there is quite possibly no possibility of distinguishing whether the mimesis is that of reproduction, or if there is always already a productive aspect to it. And by extension, if learning cannot be controlled, the very notion of teaching itself is shifted from a master-student relationality to one where the master is potentially changed as well—the relationality between the master and the student is not only inter-changing, but one cannot even know who is teaching, or learning, at any point. All that can be said is that they are in a relationality; which means that one is ultimately unable to locate the locus of knowledge, of wisdom—the site of which Plato is attempting to convince us is the sole domain of the philosopher. And it is this that philosophy is cringing from. To compound matters, philosophy is striving for wisdom; which can only come from the Gods. In other words, this is a gift that has to be bestowed on them—and more than that, wisdom is always already exterior to one’s control and knowledge. At best, it is the role of one to recognise the gift, to answer the call as it were. Here, if we listen carefully, we can hear the echo of Alexander Graham Bell, and the telephone. And as we are attempting to respond to the call of wisdom—the call that both poetry and philosophy are listening out for—it might be helpful to recall the agreement between Alexander Graham Bell and his brother Melville. In the biography, Alexander Graham Bell and the Conquest of Solitude , Robert V. Bruce notes that Aleck and Melly made a “solemn compact that whichever of us should die first would endeavour to communication with the other if it were possible to do so” (63). Since Melville was the one who passed on first, this pact put the onus on Aleck to receive the call of his brother. If you take into consideration the fact that until Melville’s death, both brothers had been working on an early prototype of the telephone, the instrument of distant sound can be read as an attempt by Aleck to maintain the possibility of keeping in touch with Melly, of hearing the voice from beyond. However, this was a connection that was not premised on any knowing, reason, or rationality; it was rather, one that was based on hope, and born out of love. And here, if we eves-drop on a cross-line with The Telephone Book , we can pick up the voice of Avital Ronell once again and hear, “the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimilation, or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading” (380). In other words, the telephone can be read as the openness to the possibility of responding to the other; one that might always remain unknown. Even in this day of caller-identification, we can never know for sure who the other person on the line is until we pick up: hence, the only decision we can make—the effects of which we remain blind to until it affects us—is to either pick up or not, to either respond or not. And it is not as if the decision to pick up comes without risks: each time we answer a call, we run the risk of it ruining our day. Even when we don’t know who the caller is, perhaps especially when we don’t know who the person on the other end of the line is—and here one only has to think of prank calls—we are leaving ourselves completely open to being affected by another. Thus, philosophy finds itself in the position of Vladimir and Estragon. Since they have no idea who Godot is, they can never know if or when he shows up—thus, if he (and we are taking his gender on the word of the boy, some boy—we don’t even know if it is the same boy—who comes round in the evening) has already come, they would not be in the position to know it. And even if someone comes to them and announces that “I am Godot,” the wait would not be over—without referentiality to the name, they would have to take on faith that that person is indeed Godot. Hence, all they can know is that they are waiting for Godot; and Godot is the name of that waiting itself. All philosophy can know is that it is waiting; and wisdom is the name of that waiting itself. Which brings us to Tina Turner’s eternal question, “what’s love got to do, got to do with it?” In order to begin to consider that, we have to first attempt to examine the notion of love itself. Perhaps we might begin to consider what the difficulty of the statement “I love you.” For, if love is a relationality between two persons—both of whom remain singular, and are attempting to respond to each other—this suggests that neither of them subsume the other under themselves. In other words, the other remains wholly other. If this is so, then the “you” in the statement always remains shrouded in mystery. And even if the “you” was replaced with the name of the person, the veiling remains: for, names refer both to the singularity that is the person, and also every other person bearing that name, at exactly the same time. To compound matters, the only time one has to utter a persons name is in their absence—thus, the correspondence of a name to that particular person is at best an affect of memory. And if we consider the notion of memory, we have to also open the register of forgetting—bringing along with it the problem that there is no object to forgetting. For instance, when one utters “I forgot,” all one is uttering is the fact that one has forgotten, and nothing more—the moment there is an object to the statement, one has strictly speaking remembered what one has forgotten. Moreover, we have no control over when forgetting happens to us. And since it is always already exterior to us, affects us, and has no necessary object, there is no reason to believe that every moment of memory might not bring with it a moment of forgetting. Hence, whenever we utter a name—even if we accept the correspondence between the utterance and the person in front of us—all we are doing is uttering the fact that we are naming. Thus, it is not so much that ‘a rose by any other name would smell as sweet’ but more appropriately, ‘a rose is a rose is a rose’—the relationality between its name and the phenomenon of its sweet smell can only be established after that moment of naming, that instance of catachresis. So, whenever one utters “I love you,” not only is it a performative statement, it is the very naming of that love—all you are doing is establishing a relationality between you and the other. And since there is no necessary referent—one is naming that referentiality as one utters it—this suggests that it is always already a symbolic statement; without which the mystery of the other cannot me maintained. In other words, one cannot love the other without maintaining this symbolic distance—through a ritual; in this case the utterance “I love you.” This might be why Valentine’s Day seems to provoke such a massive reaction: the most common one from people (besides florists) being, Valentine’s Day is mere commercialism. Those among the nay-sayers who maintain a soft spot for Karl Marx would proceed to call it the commodification of relationships; those who prefer the Gods would claim that the sanctity of relationships has been profaned; the gender theorists would note how the fact that males buy the gifts only serves to highlight the unequal power-relation between the genders. Whichever side and variation of the arguments they choose boils down to this: the discomfort lies in the fact that they are confronted with the notion of relationships moving into a mediated sphere. The underlying logic is that love is between two persons only; it should not only remain between them, but more pertinently, be an unmediated experience between two persons. Which of course completely misses the point. For, if we reopen the register that relationships are the result of a negotiation between two persons, there must then be a space between them for this very negotiation to occur. Otherwise, all that is happening is, one person is subsuming the other within their own sphere of understanding; effectively effacing the other. If that were the case, there would no longer be any relationality; all negotiation is gone and the other person is a mere extension of the self—one is in a masturbatory relationality with one’s imaginary. Hence, any relationship must always already carry with it the unknown, and possibly always unknowable. The other person is an enigma, remains—must remain—enigmatic to you. This is the only way in which the proclamation “I love you” remains singular, remains a love that is about the person as a singular person—and not merely about the qualities of the person, what the person is. For, if the mystery of the other is unveiled, then the love for the other person is also a completely transparent love: one that you can know thoroughly, calculate; a check-list. And if they are knowable, this suggests that they can also be negated, and hence, the love can also go away. Only when the love for the other person is an enigmatic one, one that cannot be understood, can that love potentially be an event—and if it is an event, then strictly speaking, it cannot be known before it happens; at best, it can be glimpsed as it is happening, or perhaps even only realised retrospectively. At the point in which it happens, it is a love that comes from elsewhere: this strange phenomenon is best captured in the colloquial phrase, I was struck by love;” or even more so by, “I was blinded by love.” This is a blinding to not only the subject of the encounter—the self—but also of the very object of that encounter, the “you”—all that can be said is that there is an encounter. And it is for this reason Cupid is blind: not just because love is random (and can happen to anyone at any time), but more importantly because even after it happens, both the reason you are in love, and the person you are in love with, remain blind to you. Since there is an unknowable relationality with the other person, the only way you can approach it is through a ritual. This is the lesson that religions have taught us: since one is never able to phenomenally experience the God(s), one has no choice but to approach them symbolically. These rituals are strictly speaking meaningless—the actual content is interchangeable—as it is the form that is important. Rituals allow us momentary glimpses at secrets; and secrets are never about their content(s). Rather, secrets entail the recognition that they are secrets; the secret lies in their form as secret. This can be seen when we consider how group secrets work: since the entire group knows the secret, clearly the content of the secret is not as important as the fact that only members within the group are privy to this secret. Occasionally the actual content can be so trivial that even other people outside the group might know the information; they just do not realize its significance. For instance, if I used my date of birth as my bank-account password, merely knowing when I was born would not instantly give you the key to my life savings. In order for that to happen, you would have had to recognise the significance of the knowledge of my birthday. This means that you have to know that you know something. Since the God(s) are, strictly speaking, unknowable, this suggests that rituals put one in a position to potentially experience the God(s). The meaningless gestures on Valentine’s Day play precisely this ritualised role. It is not so much what you give the other person, but the fact that you give it to them. The gift in this sense is very much akin to an offering; the gift opens the possibility of an exchange. Gift-giving does not guarantee that you will like what is returned; there is always a reciprocation of the gift, but what is returned to you is never known in advance, until the moment it is received. This means that the worst thing that one can do is not give the gift: that would be akin to a cutting off of all possibilities, a complete closing of all communication with the other person. This at the same time also means that you cannot wait for the other person to give you something before you get them their gift: if that were the scenario, the reciprocal gift would be nothing more than a calculated return. The only manner in which both persons can give true gifts is to offer them independently of the other person, whilst keeping them in mind. In this way, the two gifts are always already both uncalculated (in the sense of not knowing what the return is) and also a reciprocation for the other (without knowing whether the other person actually has a gift in the first place). Naturally, this would seem like an irrational, even stupid, way of buying gifts. But it is precisely the stupidity involved that saves the relationship from being banal—more importantly, stupidity prevents it from entering the mere profane. This is not to say that an enigmatic love cannot end—of course it can. However, the difference lies in the fact that if the relationality is wholly transparent, it is subsumed under reason—completely predictable, within the self, and thus never open to the possibility of otherness, exteriority, musing. A love that is an event is one that is also open to the possibility of the divine, the sacred—always already closer to the possibility of wisdom. If we establish that both love and wisdom are exterior, to our knowledge, and the finitude to our selves, this suggests that both are names for the possibility of openness to otherness. In other words, and what choice do we have here but to use the words of the other, the philosopher—the lover of wisdom—is a name for one who is waiting, and nothing more. But that still leaves us with the question of this uncomfortable relationality between philosophy and poetry. But before we address that question, we have to take a momentary detour, and consider the whether it is possible to call one a poet. For, if we take the notion of a poet to be one who reaches the highest levels of rhetoric (beyond the lawyer, and the orator, who only aim to either please the crowds, or convince by way of sophistry), then we must also acknowledge that one can only become a poet at the moment of seizing, the point of inspiration, by the muses. Without this divine moment, all (s)he can do is practice her craft. As no one can control when the muses make their appearance, one could always be practising in vain—in some way, one is always already practising to be least in the way when the muse whispers into one’s ear; one is practising so as not to be vain. And since one cannot know when the muse will appear, there is no time frame to the practising—unlike the lawyer who speaks against a clock, poetry knows no time; the only time that matters is the time appropriate to poetry itself. Thus, all the poet (if one can use this term) is practising for the possibility of effacing her/him self—and waiting. Thus, in order for poetry to occur, in order to be seized, the poet—along with all her concerns—must cease. In other words, there is no poet; there is only the possibility of poetry. However, even as there is no time frame to this waiting, even as all we can say is that poetry is a name for waiting, the one who is practising is always already also in time. And since (s)he is in a symbolic relationality with the possibility of poetry, this suggests that the practising is her sacrifice, and time is precisely what she is sacrificing. Here, it might be helpful to turn to a strange source when it comes to poetry—Georges Bataille—and consider his teachings in the first volume of The Accursed Share where he reminds us that, the “essence [of sacrifice] is to consume profitlessly .” This is where each exchange is beyond rationality, beyond calculability, beyond reason itself, “unsubordinated to the ‘real’ order and occupied only with the present.” He continues: Sacrifice destroys that which it consecrates. It does not have to destroy as fire does; only the tie that connected the offering to the world of profitable activity is severed, but this separation has the sense of a definitive consumption; the consecrated offering cannot be restored to the real order.” (58) Since there is no need for a physical change in the object of sacrifice—“it does not have to destroy as fire does”—this suggests that the tie is severed symbolically. Hence, there is an aspect of trans-substantiation in this sacrifice: the form remains the same; in fact there is no perceivable change—this is the point at which all phenomenology fails—but there is always already a difference, an absolute separation from the “real order,” from logic, calculability, reason. The object of sacrifice, the victim [,] is a surplus taken from the mass of useful wealth…Once chosen, he is the accursed share , destined for violent consumption. But the curse tears him away from the order of things…” (59). And it is this tearing away from the order of things—the order of rationality—that “restores to the sacred world that which servile use has degraded, rendered profane” (55). For, only when it is no longer useful, when it is no longer abstracted—subjected, subsumed under—merely a use-value, can the object be an object as such, can a subject be a subject as such; be a singularity. Thus, it is never so much who or what is sacrificed, but the fact that there is a sacrifice. So even as (s)he is sacrificing her time to poetry, it is always already beyond her knowledge whether what (s)he is doing is actually preparing her for poetry or not—all (s)he can know is that she is sacrificing and nothing more. Hence, all (s)he can do is to open her self to the possibility of this relationality—all (s)he can do is be in love with poetry. At the moment the muse whispers into her ear, (s)he ceases to be, and becomes a medium for poetry—and since this possession is always already beyond our cognitive knowledge, this is also a moment of divine wisdom. In other words, there is no difference between poetry and wisdom—the moment of poetry is the moment of wisdom. And this might be the very reason for the philosopher’s aversion to poets. Not so much because they may corrupt the youth (this is after all the aim of all thinking, all philosophy), but precisely because in order to do so, the philosopher must wait for a moment of possession, for divine musing, for poetry. Hence, all thought, all thinking, all philosophy, is nothing but the waiting for the possibility of poetry itself. (shrink)

En palabras de la Dra. Ivana Costa, la argumentación que aquí se propone lleva a los lectores a descubrir en la teoría epicureísta de las pasiones el fundamento de la filosofía política epicúrea [...]. Pero el eje de esta teoría está, indudablemente, en la caracterización que hace Epicuro del placer; esto es, la determinación precisa de qué lugar le cabe [...] entre los bienes para la buena vida [y] qué credenciales tiene para ser considerado el bien supremo. Este fue uno (...) de los temas centrales del debate ético-político que plantearon las diferentes líneas filosóficas en Grecia entre fines del siglo V a.C. y comienzos del siglo IV a.C. [...] Epicuro intentaba demostrar [...] que la justicia, entendida como virtud individual, se identifica con el placer, a contracorriente de la communis opinio, que la concibe destinada al beneficio de los demás. Al identificar a la virtud de la justicia con la ataraxia, al concebirla como virtud que es también capaz de "tranquilizar" con eficacia a quien la posee y la practica (porque es precisamente su contrario, la injusticia, la que provoca la turbación del alma), la noción epicúrea de justicia queda unida también a su singular teoría del placer. Que no es mero disfrute personal sino actividad que extirpa las opiniones equivocadas y las sustituye por estados mentales verdaderos y adecuados. La investigación que da origen a este libro había mostrado, con sólidas herramientas de análisis de las fuentes y exhaustiva discusión de la literatura sobre el tema, que el concepto epicúreo de justicia no puede escindirse del entramado de la lógica, la física y la ética del maestro de Samos. [...] Se parte entonces de esa trama compleja y, con delicadeza y generosidad, la argumentación va deshilvanando los motivos que han llevado tradicionalmente a una interpretación convencionalista o naturalista de la filosofía epicúrea. Finalmente, señala que el profesor Navarro nos propone considerar el concepto de justicia subrayando la posición excéntrica que insinúa Epicuro respecto de la contraposición nómos-phýsis en la que se venía dirimiendo la cuestión desde finales del siglo V a.C. El análisis [...] abre a la posibilidad de una reconstrucción global de la filosofía política epicúrea [y] permite reformular, a partir del eje naturaleza-convención, tanto su teoría física, como su gnoseología [...]. En cuanto a los aspectos específicamente políticos de la filosofía de Epicuro, la argumentación va, de los comienzos de la asociación humana, al estatuto de las leyes, el progreso de la historia y el papel de la prólepsis como criterio de lo justo. (shrink)

Recent statistics in South Africa shows that women mostly experience poverty as compared to their male counterparts. In the context of the experience of poverty by women, several Old Testament scholars have convincingly explored the theme of poverty in the Hebrew Bible. In her contextual rereading of the Naomi-Ruth Story, Madipoane Masenya links the issue of poverty to the theme of land. Also, from the historical-critical and partly, the contextual approach to ancient texts, Esias E. Meyer argues that Leviticus 25:8-55 (...) holds liberating possibilities for women who are invisible in such a text. Based on the argument made by the preceding scholars, firstly, this article argues that in the context from which the texts of Ruth 4 and Leviticus 25:8-55 emerged, some women were both landless and poor. Secondly, it is argued in this article that the context of these texts carries a striking resemblance to the situation of women in modern South Africa, as many women do not own productive land and are poor. Thirdly, this article poses the question: What implications do the ideologies of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara and the hermeneutical approach of Fernando F. Segovia to ancient texts bear on the reading of Ruth 4 and Leviticus 25:8-55 in South Africa? (shrink)

En este artículo intentamos recopilar las diferentes respuestas que se han dado al interrogante: ¿cuál es la naturaleza de la guerra en Colombia? Para ello, hemos estudiado seis formas de definir la violencia en Colombia: i) guerra anti/comunista; ii) conflicto agrario; iii) conflicto criminalizado; iv) guerra civil/guerra contra la sociedad; v) conflicto internacionalizado; vi) amenaza terrorista. Concluimos que los cambios de los actores armados, sus repertorios de violencia y del contexto internacional son respondidos por masas críticas con nuevas denominaciones. Las (...) denominaciones, así como la guerra misma, son dinámicas. Este artículo aporta una revisión de literatura sobre la naturaleza del conflicto y una perspectiva de análisis historiográfico útil para otras preguntas relacionadas con la guerra. (shrink)

Extensa exposición de la recepción del darwinismo en el Uruguay, que llega hasta la actualidad. Salvo en épocas más recientes, las reacciones, en favor o en contra, fueron de índole ideológica más que científica, especialmente a partir del concocimiento de The descent of man. Las polémicas entre católicos y 'evolucionistas' tienen, según el autor, su punto candente entre 1871-90. Le siguió un período de mayor apaciguamiento, en que la cuestión se consideró en función de los desarrollos de la ciencia biológica. (...) Es obligado poner esta contribución en relación con la obra de Thomas Glick, Darwin y el darwinismo: en el Uruguay y en América Latina (ver HLAS 56:5067)"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58. (shrink)

El tema principal es la concepción de la política en Julio Irazusta (1899-1982), pensador adherido al nacionalismo argentino. Pero la obra tiene un sentido integral, y trata aspectos de biografía intelectual y analiza las influencias de autores como Maurras, Burke, de Maistre y Croce, que habrían obrado sobre el pensamiento de Irazusta"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58.

O propósito geral deste artigo consiste em mostrar, a partir de hipóteses globais de interpretação da natureza e da arte, o lugar da pintura na filosofia de F. W. J. v. Schelling. Submetendo a obra pictórica a condições teórico-especulativas inovadoras, a ponderação schellinguiana impele-nos, não raro, a um tratamento diferenciado do visível. Por isso, a título de exercício de reflexão, espera-se igualmente indicar que tal caracterização da pintura ecoa e antecipa, ao longe, questões levantadas pela filosofia contemporânea – em especial, (...) pela fenomenologia – a respeito da imagem. (shrink)

Introduzione: L'uomo alla scoperta di se stesso, di N. Fabro.--Realtà della condizione umana e valori morali; appunti per una antropologia attuale, di S. Misser.--Fede nella creazione ed evoluzionismo, di P. Smulders.--Il senso biologico della morale di San Paolo, di José-Maria Gonzalez-Ruiz.--Immagine umanistica dell'uomo, di J.P. van Praag.--L'etica della situazione, di E. Schillebeeckx.--Dossier Teilhard de Chardin: Introduzione, Teilhard de Chardin, o della fede nell'uomo, di F.V. Joannes. Destino cosmico e destino individuale dell'uomo, di A. Catemario. L'evoluzione spirituale del genere umano, di (...) P. Martini. La Persona nel fenomeno della socializzazione, di F. Russo. (shrink)

EUVÉ, François. Science, foi, sagesse . Faut-il parler de convergence? João Batista Libanio MUTSCHLER, Hans-Dieter. Physik und religion . Perspektiven und Grenzen eines Dialogs. João Batista Libanio RIEGER, Joerg. Remember the poor . The callenge to theology in the twenty-first century. João Batista Libanio RIBEIRO, Fernando. Os Incas . As plantas do poder e um tribunal espanhol. João Batista Libanio SOUZA, Alberto de Mello e (Org.). Dimensões da avaliação educacional . Suzana dos Santos Gomes BOFF, Leonardo. Virtudes para um (...) outro mundo possível . v. I: Hospitalidade: direito e dever de todos. BOFF, Leonardo. Virtudes para um outro mundo possível . v. II: Convivência, respeito & tolerância . Paulo Agostinho Nogueira Baptista LIBANIO, João Batista. Qual o futuro do Cristianismo? Paulo Agostinho Nogueira Baptista. (shrink)

SENA, Luzia (Org.). Ensino religioso e formação docente . (Religious teaching and teacher qualification) Amauri Carlos Ferreira SANGENIS, Luiz Fernando Conde. Gênese do pensamento único em educação: franciscanismo e jesuitismo na história da educação brasileira. (Genesis of an only thought in education: franciscanism and Jesuitism in the history of Brazilian education) Antônio Francisco da Silva TREVISAN, A. Santo Tomás de Aquino – O Credo: tradução, prefácio, introdução e notas. (Saint Thomas of Aquinas – The Creed: translation, preface, introduction and (...) notes) Ivonei Antônio de Oliveira BENELLI, Sílvio José. Pescadores de homens. Estudo psicossocial de um seminário católico. (Fishers of men. A psycho-social study of a Catholic seminary) João Batista Libanio ESTRADA, Juan Antonio. A impossível teodicéia: a crise de fé em Deus e o problema do mal. (The impossible theodicy: the crisis of faith in God and the problem of evil) Lindomar Rocha Mota USARSKI, Frank. Constituintes da Ciência da Religião: cinco ensaios em prol de uma disciplina. (Constituents of the science of religion: five essays on behalf of a discipline) Roberlei Panasiewicz CONGAR, Yves. Ele é o Senhor e dá a vida. (He is the Lord and bestows life) Roberlei Panasiewicz. (shrink)

Durante la estancia de la corte de Felipe V en Sevilla entre los años de 1729 a 1733, la ciudad agonizante tanto social como económicamente tras perder la hegemonía universal que le hizo ser Puerta de las Américas, vive un período de esplendor que le hace soñar por ese tiempo con las glorias de tiempos pasados. La estancia de la corte exalta el sentimiento religioso del pueblo fiel, se sigue luchando por la definición dogmática de la Inmaculada Concepción, los reyes (...) participan en ceremonias litúrgicas catedralicias y es el propio Felipe V el que consigue la finalización de la urna barroca de Laureano de Pina para venerar el cuerpo incorrupto de Fernando III beatificado en 1671 y cuyo estreno tuvo lugar el 14 de mayo de 1729 en una ceremonia claramente barroquizante y definida por un cronista contemporáneo como “la función mas prodigiosa que ha habido en los siglos”. (shrink)

t. 1. Dialog s V. V. Davydovym -- t. 2. Nereshennye problemy razvivai︠u︡shchego obrazovanii︠a︡.

To begin with -- Genealogy of the cerebral subject -- Disciplines of the neuro -- Cerebralizing distress -- Brains on screen and paper -- Up for grabs.

_The purpose_ of the article is to comprehend the Husserlian model of constituting temporal modes through the ability of intentional "retentional-protentional" consciousness, as well as to clarify the possibility of interpreting its positions in the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time. _Theoretical basis._ The theoretical framework of the research includes: 1) the interpretation of the phenomenological reflection of "time-consciousness" by E. Husserl in the context of solving the problem of phased-differentiation of this form of temporality; 2) the concept of (...) anthropic time (V. Khanzhy). _Originality._ For the first time in research literature, the possibilities of applying the ideas of Husserl to the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time are considered through the interpretation of the phenomenological solution to the problem of temporality, proposed and specified in Husserl’s "time-consciousness" concept. _Conclusions._ The comprehension of the Husserlian model of intentionality of consciousness through the "grasping-from-now" and the constitution of phases of phenomenological time through the component of "exiting-from-now" showed that solving the problem of phased-differentiation of phenomenological time leads to the observation of the impossibility of isolating the modes of past, present, and future as self-sufficient and unconditional. More accurate indications, based on the constitutive intentionality of consciousness on the "grasping-from-now" phases of time (as conventional), are as follows: a) the abilities of retention and recollection are the foundation for the constitution of the past and its connections to the present; b) the perception establishes the basis for the phase of the present itself; c) the possibilities of protention and anticipation (as forms of imagination) constitute the future and its connections to the present. By the concept of retention, Husserl fixes a certain primary memory (the present "now" of a past interval), which enables retaining the past in the present. The category of recollection or secondary memory is used by the philosopher to refer to the self-sufficient reproduction of past experiences (without being joined to present perception). The fundamental difference between recollection and retention is that the former _re-_presents a temporal interval, grasping its content and reproducing it as it was in the past, while in the latter, the perceived duration is presented as a fragment of time that has just passed. According to the German philosopher, the "grasping" of the present phase is performed by perception. Through the constitutive intentionality of consciousness, perception synthesizes the results of primary-actual activity and retentional holding of duration. The second part of the article will present solutions to the following research tasks: 1) analysis of the possibilities of protention and anticipation in constituting the future and its connections with the present; 2) understanding the possibility of using interpreted forms of Husser’s ideas in reconstructing the concept of anthropic time. (shrink)

El objetivo propuesto en el siguiente trabajo es elucidar cómo desde la finitud de la existencia puede establecerse la problemática de la temporalidad dentro del entramado de pensamiento de Martin Heidegger. Para ello realizaremos un análisis de la conferencia de 1924 Der Begriff der Zeit, uno de los textos que allanan el camino a Sein und Zeit, en lugar de centrar la investigación en la considerada obra magna de Heidegger. Una reflexión acerca de este texto previo permitirá avanzar en el (...) análisis de la existencia al mostrar cómo el tiempo está arraigado en la existencia individual, no como un solipsismo, sino como apertura de posibilidades respecto del mundo (a la postre compartido con los otros). Una descripción fenomenológica de la muerte posibilitará la apertura al mundo, definiendo una temporalidad existencial que incluye no sólo al instante presente, sino también al pasado (concebido bajo la forma del «haber-sido») y al futuro. (shrink)